“I love the people of Europe”: This is why JD Vance is now interfering in our migration policy

When I recently interviewed JD Vance , he struck a more conciliatory tone toward Europe than the continent has recently seen. "I love the people of Europe," the US vice president said. Nevertheless, he persisted in his criticism of European leaders, complaining that they have underinvested in national defense. This accusation is perhaps well known, having been made by Democratic and Republican administrations at least since the presidency of George W. Bush.

Vance's second complaint, however, is likely to be perceived as new and disturbing in most European capitals: Here, he was concerned with immigration policy and the refusal of Europe's centrist parties to meet people's demands for less immigration. "The entire democratic project of the West falls apart," Vance said, "when people repeatedly demand less immigration and are rewarded by their leaders with more immigration."

Why should the American Vice President address the European migration issue, an internal matter decided by the European Union and its member states? The answer to this question must be distinguished from three dimensions.

In 2015, I often heard refugees ask the question: “Where can we get the best social assistance?”

The first dimension is obvious: public relations. Of course, European immigration policy cannot simply be dismissed as a project of elitist paternalism—but this accusation is not entirely unfounded. When I was reporting on the migration wave from London for the Wall Street Journal ( WSJ ) in 2015, I noticed a telling discrepancy: between the optimistic rhetoric of European elites and the realities that would soon contradict this.

I joined the influx of migrants stretching from Turkey through the Greek islands and the Balkans to their final destination. For most of the 1.3 million new arrivals, that was Germany. As an Iranian migrant who had come to the West, I assumed I was full of sympathy for the migrants. So were the editors of the WSJ, which has long advocated for open borders. But that sympathy couldn't withstand contact with reality, even as most mainstream journalists followed Angela Merkel's "We can do it" line and castigated skeptics.

Many who arrived at that time expanded the definition of who qualifies as a refugee. Syrians fleeing the civil war in their country made up only a third, as I observed (and as Eurostat later confirmed). The others were economic migrants, but not particularly ambitious ones. It was obvious that integrating these men—they were predominantly young and male—would be a major challenge: When I lived undercover in an Afghan smuggler's safehouse in Istanbul , I witnessed repeated outbreaks of violence. I often heard the question: "Where can we get the best social assistance?"

JD Vance wants a populist international

A decade later, Merkel's decision to open Europe's gates continues to shape European societies and their policies. The resulting social disintegration and the ongoing strain on public services fueled support for right-wing parties. Even established parties, particularly the Danish Social Democrats, felt compelled to respond to calls for a stricter border regime and tougher integration measures.

Vance is banking on his ability to speak over the heads of Europe's leading politicians—directly to the disaffected segment of the European public. The maneuver could have advantages. Undoubtedly, some Europeans are thinking, "I wish we had a Vance here," even if they may not express it publicly. But the move could also backfire, as many Europeans dislike being lectured by Americans about their domestic affairs, just as Americans dislike European politicians blathering on about "Black Lives Matter."

The second dimension of Vance's strategy is the dream of a conservative-populist international. That is, Vance and the broader Trump movement would prefer to deal with a Europe dominated by nationalist and populist conservatives. This is already the case in several EU states, including Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Slovakia, to name a few. A broad, cross-generational shift to the right may be underway, and the Trumpists are not averse to giving this historic spirit a boost.

Here, too, the advantage is obvious. Parties like to help their friends across national borders (hence why British Labour Party activists campaigned for Kamala Harris last year, but it didn't do much for her at the ballot box). Trumpists would prefer to negotiate with a Europe that speaks their political language and sees the world through a similar lens: a Europe that prioritizes national interests and identity over transnational ideals.

“I don’t think a more independent Europe is bad for the United States.”

The downside of this is unmistakable. A Europe that is becoming increasingly nationalistic is less willing to accept American leadership, whether Trump-aligned or liberal-internationalist. Nationalist parties in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, often argue that the continent should maintain a kind of equidistance between Washington and Beijing amid the growing rivalry between the two superpowers. Wouldn't the Trump administration prefer to see a Europe that sides with America, for example, on the issue of Taiwan?

To be fair, Vance was quite intellectually consistent on this point. He told me: "I don't think a more independent Europe is bad for the United States—it's good for the United States. Looking back at history, I think the British and French were certainly right to disagree with Eisenhower over the Suez Canal." He cited Charles de Gaulle's assertive, independent stance toward Washington as a model for the 21st century and suggested that the Iraq War might not have happened if more EU leaders had opposed George W. Bush's hard line.

JD Vance really believes in his critique of neoliberalism

This brings us to the third dimension of his European strategy: genuine conviction. Vance's worldview is deeply shaped by how his native Appalachia suffered under the neoliberal model. As he told me in an earlier interview, before Trump chose him as his nominee, he sees labor mobility as an essential element of the neoliberal order, allowing corporations to import a reserve army of unskilled workers willing to work for less, thus undermining the wages and bargaining power of native workers.

He fears that such mass migration would transform Western democracies into societies not unlike those in the Persian Gulf, with a narrow elite ruling over serfs.

While progressives and the labor movement were willing to oppose the free movement of goods—the other key element of neoliberal ideology—they dare not touch migration. For Vance, this represents an opportunity for the right to win over working-class voters who once voted for the traditional parties of the left. This realignment is already well underway in the United States and is increasingly shaping the situation in Europe. With his sharper statements, Vance is therefore addressing the continent's future leaders rather than its current rulers.